Does Self-Certification Encourage or Reduce Opportunistic Behavior?
通过实验研究自我认证要求（管理者签署声明承担决策责任）对减少机会主义行为的效果，发现它在第一阶段有效，但在第二阶段若之前已自我认证过机会主义决策则反而增加机会主义行为，且监控控制会削弱其效果。
ABSTRACT We experimentally investigate the effectiveness of a self-certification requirement as an informal control to reduce opportunistic behavior. We predict and find that a requirement that managers sign to take sole responsibility for their decisions—even though the decision is kept private—acts as a “double-edged sword.” Using a capital investment setting involving two decision stages, we find that self-certifying managers are less likely to behave opportunistically at the first stage. However, at the second stage, managers are more likely to behave opportunistically if they previously self-certified an opportunistic decision. Additional analysis indicates that a monitoring-based control removes the effectiveness of self-certification altogether. Overall, we find that the effectiveness of a self-certification requirement in reducing opportunistic behavior is bounded by its timing and the presence of other controls; it is potentially useful when managers are making a first decision, and only in the absence of a formal monitoring system. Data Availability: Data available upon request. Please contact the authors.