Come Aboard! Exploring the Effects of Directorships in the Executive Labor Market
研究非CEO高管担任董事如何通过认证机制和获取独特资源，提升其晋升CEO的可能性和薪酬水平，基于美国大型上市公司1996-2012年数据。
In this study, we examine the following question: What do executives gain from serving on boards? We propose that board service benefits non-CEO-level executives in the executive labor market by acting as a certification mechanism and by providing access to unique knowledge, skills, and connections. We argue that non-CEO executives who gain directorships will be more likely to be promoted to CEO both inside and outside their home firm, will be more likely to be promoted internally, and will receive higher pay from their home firms. To test our ideas, we employ propensity score matching to construct a longitudinal sample of 2,104 top executives of large, publicly traded companies in the United States over the period 1996 to 2012. The results provide consistent support for our theory.