Delegating Multiple Decisions
研究如何将针对代理人偏好的上限规则扩展到多决策委托问题，发现当代理人存在恒定偏差时上限可能恰好最优，并讨论了在政治委托、资本投资、垄断定价和关税政策中的应用。
This paper shows how to extend the heuristic of capping an agent against her bias to delegation problems over multiple decisions. Caps may be exactly optimal when the agent has constant biases, in which case a cap corresponds to a ceiling on the weighted average of actions. More generally caps give approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions. The shape of the cap translates into economic intuition on how to let an agent trade off increases on one action for decreases on other actions. I discuss applications to political delegation, capital investments, monopoly price regulation, and tariff policy.