Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions
利用公司拍卖数据，从出价中估算战略竞标者和财务竞标者的估值，发现多数目标公司被战略竞标者估值更高，但22.4%的成熟、业绩差的公司被财务竞标者估值更高，且不同战略竞标者估值更分散，财务竞标者估值与经济状况相关。
ABSTRACT Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by strategic bidders. However, 22.4% of targets in our sample are valued higher by financial bidders. These are mature, poorly performing companies. We also find that (i) valuations of different strategic bidders are more dispersed and (ii) valuations of financial bidders are correlated with aggregate economic conditions. Our results suggest that different targets appeal to different types of bidders, rather than that strategic bidders always value targets more because of synergies.