Incentives to Acquire Information under Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure
研究在强制披露和自愿披露两种法律规则下，一方在谈判前获取信息的激励差异，发现自愿披露下拥有全部谈判权的一方可能过度投资信息获取，而信息只对非获取方有利时则激励不足。
This article examines the incentives of a party to acquire information prior to negotiating contractual terms with a second party under two different legal regimes: mandatory versus voluntary disclosure. By assumption, information can only truthfully be disclosed but, under voluntary disclosure, having found no evidence cannot credibly be communicated. If the information-acquiring party has all the bargaining power, then, under voluntary disclosure, she will invest more in information acquisition than is welfare maximizing in many situations. At lesser bargaining power, however, this need not be the case. If information directly benefits the non-acquiring party only, then incentives to acquire under voluntary disclosure are less than under mandatory disclosure, and the latter leads to less than welfare-maximizing acquisition. Most results are independent of the underlying bargaining structure as mainly use of constraints is made that hold for equilibrium payoffs from any bargaining game.