An “Opposing Responses” Test of Classic versus Market-Based Promotion Tournaments
利用芬兰工人-企业匹配面板数据，通过系统计量方法检验经典与市场型晋升锦标赛模型，发现经典模型得到支持：晋升依赖相对绩效、工资结构凸性、晋升概率随竞争者数量递减、绩效随工资差距递增，且工人与企业对绩效随机波动方差变化做出相反调整。
We use a systems-based econometric method to show that classic and market-based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models. Implementing the method using a large, Finnish, worker-firm matched panel, we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance, the firm’s wage structure is convex, promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors, performance is increasing in the wage spread, and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes.