The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination
通过修改的猎鹿博弈实验，研究高阶信念（关于信念的信念）及其不确定性如何影响协调决策，发现当玩家相信他人对自己投资持乐观态度时更愿意投资，而消除信念不确定性可带来效率提升。
Abstract Beliefs about other players’ strategies are crucial in determining outcomes for coordination games. If players are to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium, they must believe that others will coordinate with them. In many settings there is uncertainty about beliefs as well as strategies. Do people consider these “higher-order” beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) when making coordination decisions? I design a modified stag hunt experiment that allows me to identify how these higher-order beliefs and uncertainty about higher-order beliefs matter for coordination. Players prefer to invest especially when they believe that others are “optimistic” that they will invest; but knowledge that others think them unlikely to invest does not cause players to behave differently than when they do not know what their partners think about them. Thus resolving uncertainty about beliefs can result in marked efficiency gains.