Fairness and utilitarianism without independence
重新审视Harsanyi的功利主义中立观察者定理，提出社会决策应基于程序公平的社会规范而非个体独立性假设，并证明了一个新的功利主义结果。
In this work we reconsider Harsanyi’s celebrated (J Polit Econ 61:434–435, 1953; J Polit Econ 63:309–321, 1955; Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977) utilitarian impartial observer theorem. Departing from Harsanyi’s individual-centered approach, we argue that when societal decisions are at stake, postulates must not be drawn from individualistic behavior. Rather, they should be based on societal norms. Continuing this line of thinking, we state and prove a utilitarian result that, rather than being based on the independence assumption, is based on the societal norm of procedural fairness.