Disclosure and Choice
研究了代理人可在随机项目中披露真实结果给观察者时的选择行为，发现代理人偏好高风险项目导致选择无效率，并分析了挑战者披露信息时的均衡结果。
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer's expectation of the outcome. With some probability, the agent can disclose the true outcome to the observer. We show that choice is inefficient: the agent favors riskier projects even with lower expected returns. If information can be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer, the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information, excessively risk{averse when the challenger has better access, and efficient otherwise. We also characterize the agent's worst-case equilibrium payoff.