Contracting on Ambiguous Prospects
研究了当一方对相关不确定性感到模糊时如何设计合同，发现该方只需观察谈判对象的收益或损失，无需了解潜在状态，并引入“警惕性”条件确保最优合同单调且激励相容。
We study contracting problems where one party perceives ambiguity about the relevant contingencies. We show that the party who perceives ambiguity has to observe only the revenue/loss generated by the prospect object of negotiation, but not the underlying state. We, then, introduce a novel condition (vigilance), which extends the popular monotone likelihood ratio property to settings featuring ambiguity. Under vigilance, optimal contracts are monotonic and, thus, produce the right incentives in the presence of both concealed information and hidden actions. Our result holds irrespectively of the party’s attitude towards ambiguity. Sharper results obtain in the case of global ambiguity‐loving behaviour.