Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions
研究了独立私人价值下动态第二价格拍卖中买家延迟出价的均衡，发现延迟揭示价值会减少高价值买家进入并降低社会福利，但能保证参与激励。
We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers place coordinated low early bids. These buyers revise their bids to reflect their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their valuations immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in the delayed revelation equilibria. Delayed revelation of buyer values decreases social welfare, but is necessary for bidders to have a strict participation incentive.