The Influence of Family Ownership on Long-Lived Asset Write-Offs
基于代理理论，研究家族企业与非家族企业在长期资产减记行为上的差异，发现非家族企业利用减记进行盈余管理，而家族企业的减记更符合实际业绩下滑。
Building on agency theory, this article investigates whether family firms’ accounting behavior regarding long-lived asset write-offs differs from that of nonfamily firms. We provide evidence that nonfamily firms use write-offs for earnings management purposes, while family firms report write-offs coherent with the firm performance. Family firms experience dwindling sales and lower profitability in the years following the write-offs, consistently with an effective decline in their assets value. The findings are consistent with reduced owner-manager agency conflicts in family firms. We find no indication of family entrenchment, which is consistent with family owners being concerned with the reputational damage associated with a loss of a firm’s asset value.