STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION
提出新理论解释企业为何让员工多任务而非专业化：员工通过偏好任务上超常表现、厌恶任务上偷懒来影响未来工作分配，企业则承诺未来多任务以激励早期努力；产品市场波动削弱承诺可信性，导致多任务与波动负相关，与实证一致。
We provide a new theory to explain why firms multitask workers instead of specializing them. Workers overperform in tasks they like and underperform in tasks they dislike to favorably influence future job assignments. Anticipating this, firms may find it optimal to commit to future multitasking to induce workers to appropriately allocate effort early in the employment relationship. We show that when the product market is volatile, so that future product prices are uncertain, the firm's ability to credibly commit to a multitasking strategy diminishes. This generates a negative relationship between multitasking and product market volatility, consistent with recent empirical evidence.