OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS
研究了同时存在大小交易者和公共项目选择的经济，给出了竞争性配置与核心一致的两个充分条件，并展示了广义Aubin合作方法如何可以省去这些条件。
We study economies that involve both small and large traders as well as the choice of a public project. Within this framework, we establish two sufficient conditions under which the set of competitive allocations coincides with the core. Our first core equivalence result holds under the assumption that there is a countably infinite set of large traders similar to each other. The second result, independent of the number of large traders, requires the existence of a coalition of small traders with the same characteristics of the large traders. Finally, we show how the generalized Aubin approach to cooperation may dispense with both conditions.