Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty
研究了一家无限期经营的企业面对不同能力的短期工人时，承诺雇佣的价值。发现只有当努力对产出有延迟影响时，均衡才显示雇佣承诺，这能激励工人努力并帮助企业识别能力。
We analyze commitment to employment in an environment in which an infinitely lived firm faces a sequence of finitely lived workers who differ in their ability. A worker’s ability is initially unknown, and a worker’s effort affects how informative about ability the worker’s performance is. We show that equilibria display commitment to employment only when effort has a delayed impact on output. In this case, insurance against early termination encourages workers to exert effort, thus allowing the firm to better identify workers’ ability. Our results help explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which workers’ ability is uncertain.