The Early Succession Stage of a Family Firm
通过一项长达10年的纵向案例研究，分析了上市家族企业在早期继任阶段如何调节家族与非家族股东、大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突，并发现管家行为、代际协作和灵活继任计划有助于形成共同愿景和新的治理结构。
This article examines the early succession stage of a public family firm through a single longitudinal real-time case study conducted over a period of 10 years. We found that, at this stage, the regulation of interdependent conflicts of interest (between family and nonfamily shareholders, and between majority and minority family shareholders) is a prominent objective of the incumbent generation in the purpose of preparing both the firm and the family to facilitate succession. Moreover, we suggest that stewardship, through reciprocal altruism at the family branch level, combined with a permanent collaborative process between generations and a flexible succession “plan” explains at least partially the observed outcomes (shared vision on future ownership and control, and new family firm governance and interfamily branch relationships).