The use of executive share-based compensation in Poland: investigating institutional and agency-based determinants in an emerging market
研究了波兰上市公司使用高管股权薪酬的决定因素，发现国家所有权和主要股东之间的冲突是关键，挑战了传统代理理论在新兴市场的适用性。
In this paper we investigate the under-researched topic of the use of executive share-based compensation in Poland, and we analyse empirically whether theoretical explanations developed and applied mainly in the context of developed countries also hold in this specific context. Building on agency and institutional theories we study the determinants of using executive share-based pay in 362 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. As a result, we highlight the role of the state in Polish firms and the need to consider specifically principal–principal conflicts typical of emerging economies in post-state-socialist organisational research. Our findings not only reflect particularities of the institutional environment in the country studied but also highlight the limits of the traditional principal–agent lens applied in emerging economies.