Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency
研究了当低级别罪犯与司法合作换取宽大时，其内部信息可能反而助长犯罪头目并提高犯罪收益，因此最优宽大政策需权衡信息揭露的正面效果与信息租金对犯罪组织的外部性，最终导致立法者限制知情者参与宽大计划。
When ‘low‐rank’ criminals are offered to cooperate with justice in exchange of judicial leniency, their information generates ex post rents that may actually favour their bosses and increase the crime profitability. Hence, an optimal leniency policy must trade off the positive impact of helpful disclosure of insider information and the positive externality that these rents exert on the organisation’s returns from crime. Due to this tension, the amnesty that minimises the probability of crime induces the Legislator to restrict the access to the programme, by excluding informants owning potentially useful knowledge. This result survives to a number of robustness checks.