Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model
在一个存在不可观测生产率差异和内生非自愿失业的搜索均衡模型中，刻画了最优非线性所得税，发现再分配税收会扭曲劳动力需求和工资，导致总工资、失业率和参与率低于有效水平，平均税率递增，边际税率在顶端也为正。数值模拟表明，该设定下再分配的重要性远超可比的标准Mirrlees模型。
This paper characterizes optimal non-linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum \nof unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to \nfrictions in the labor markets. Redistributive taxation distorts labor demand and wages. \nCompared to their efficient values, gross wages, unemployment and participation are lower. \nAverage tax rates are increasing. Marginal tax rates are positive, even at the top. Finally, \nnumerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than \nin a comparable Mirrlees (1971) setting.