团队合作与道德风险:来自急诊科的证据

Teamwork and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Emergency Department

Journal of Political Economy · 2016
被引 91
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了两种医生工作分配系统(护士管理与自我管理),发现自我管理系统通过减少医生拖延患者出院时间的道德风险,提高了急诊科的生产效率。

Abstract

I investigate how teamwork may reduce moral hazard by joint monitoring and management. I study two organizational systems differing in the extent to which physicians may mutually manage work: Physicians are assigned patients in a “nurse-managed” system but divide patients between themselves in a “self-managed” system. The self-managed system increases throughput productivity by reducing a “foot-dragging” moral hazard, in which physicians prolong patient stays as expected future work increases. I find evidence that physicians in the same location have better information about each other and that, in the self-managed system, they use this information to assign patients.

团队合作道德风险急诊科患者分配