Conflict between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders: Much Ado about Nothing?
通过分析股东提案，研究了上市家族企业中控股家族与少数股东之间的冲突，发现这种担忧在多数情况下可能不必要，仅在特定条件下才显著。
We examine the unique nature of conflict between controlling family owners and minority shareholders (principal–principal conflict) in publicly traded family controlled firms through examining shareholder proposals. Implicit in prior governance and family business research has been that nonfamily shareholders are likely to be in conflict with the dominant family owners. In general, we find that much of this fear may be unwarranted except under specific circumstances. Our findings elucidate sources of heterogeneity in family firm principal–principal conflict and add greater nuance to our understanding of this type of agency problem within family firms.