Institutional Reforms and the Effects of Family Control on Corporate Governance
研究分析了家族治理企业如何适应制度改革，发现改革降低了企业对家族治理的依赖，消除了金字塔所有权结构对绩效的负面影响，并促进了国内机构投资者的外部治理作用。
According to the institution-based view of corporate governance, firm-governance efficiency is influenced by the institutional environment in which the firm operates. In this study, we examine how firms under a family-governance system adapted to institutional reforms over time. The results of the analysis indicate that institutional reforms reduce firm dependence on family governance and eliminate the negative effects on performance exerted by a controlling family’s pyramidal ownership structure. We also find that institutional reforms foster external corporate governance by domestic institutional investors. In conclusion, our study shows that institutional reforms alter the essence of family firm governance.