Bank Leverage and Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Great Depression and Great Recession
比较大萧条前和大衰退前的银行监管制度差异，发现1920年代大银行在资产价格上升时提高资本水平，而2002-2007年大机构将资本维持在监管最低线附近，表明更多市场纪律本可促使2008年危机前美国大银行持有更多资本缓冲。
In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.