Information Advantage,Timing and Insider Trading
研究中国股权分置改革后，原非流通股股东在盈余预测发布前后的交易行为，发现他们利用信息优势在坏消息前卖出、好消息后卖出，且交易量随消息好坏程度变化，揭示了内幕交易的新形式。
After equity division reform,insider trading during the sales of originally non-tradable shares would be the new form of tunneling in China.By investigating the sales of originally non-tradable shares around the earnings forecasts released,this paper studies the insider trading of originally non-tradable shareholders.The findings are as follows.Firsdy,the shareholders would like to sell shares before bad news released and after good news released.Secondly,if shares are sold before /after earnings forecasts released,the worse/better the news is the more shares would be traded.Finally,when shares are traded before earnings forecasts released, the difference between formal earnings and forecasting earnings will be worse than that of after earnings forecasts released.This means that shareholders time their trade based on not only the earnings forecast but also the prospect of future earnings,and demonstrates the information advantage of the insiders further.