Bank Risk Management,Loan Disclosure and Market Reaction to M&A Announcements
研究银行风险管理如何影响贷款披露对并购公告市场反应的作用，发现贷款披露能提升收购方首次公告的超额收益，且风险管理增强了这一效应。
This paper focuses on the relationship between bank risk management and capital market Using 435 equity - acquisition samples with cash payment and more than 10 million RMB Yuan for each deal from 2001 to 2010,in which the bidders are China listed firms,we find that almost half of out samples disclosed their bank loans before MA announcement We show that if the bidder makes at least once loan announcement before the acquisition,the bidder gains an excessive stock return in its first bid announcement Furthermore,we document that bank risk management improves the effect of bank loan disclosure on the MA announcement return.Our results indicate that risk management will increase the informativeness in bank loan disclosure and reduce investors' adverse selection which avoids the losses of market value of high quality acquirers.Therefore,we suggest that risk management not only keeps bank industry healthy,but also externalizes capital market positively, which improves the efficiency of pricing.