A Study on the Relationship between Banking Price Competition and Risk-taking Behavior in the Process of Lending Rate Marketization
基于1998-2010年中国14家主要商业银行的面板数据，用勒纳指数衡量价格竞争，发现贷款利率上限放开后价格竞争加剧，且价格竞争有助于缓解银行信用风险，但对经营风险无显著影响。
Lending rate marketization is an important step in the formation ot China's banking competition.This paper empirically examines the relationship between banking price competition and risk-taking behavior,based on the estimation of Lerner Index,employing panel data from 14 main national commercial banks during 1998- 2010.The results show that;(1) the liberalization of lending rate ceiling on October 2004 becomes the beginning of deepening of banking price competition;(2 ) At present,price competition will help to ease banks' credit risk,while it doesn't have any significant impact on banks' operational risk;(3) the cancellation of interest rate ceiling doesn't affect banks' credit risk-adjustment behavior directly,but it may cause temporal operational risk.