Non-tradable Share Reform,Earnings Management,and the Executive Pay-for-performance Sensitivity
研究2002-2009年中国上市公司数据，发现非流通股改革后高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性提高，但盈余管理对薪酬的影响也增强，剔除盈余管理后敏感性未显著改善。
Using a sample of the listed firms in the period of 2002 ~ 2009,this paper suggests that the executive pay - for - performance sensitivity has been improved significandy after the non - tradable share reform,especially for non - state - controlled companies.However,the impacts of earnings management on executive compensation also become more prevalent Further analysis suggests that the sensitivity between executive pay and corporate performance adjusted for the impact of earnings management is not significandy improved after the non - tradable share reform.