信用拥挤的理论分析

A Theoretical Analysis of Credit Crowding

The Journal of Financial Research · 2009
被引 0
ABS 3

中文导读

定义了信贷集中和过度借贷为信用拥挤,分析了其成因,包括银行对短期风险的极度规避、对短期利润的偏好以及利率限制,企业软预算约束和维持银企关系的动机,以及银行管理中的羊群行为,指出信用拥挤导致信贷资源配置效率下降。

Abstract

This paper defines the phenomenon of lending concentration and over-borrowing as credit crowding, which contrast th the credit rationing and also put emphasis on the reasons of this situation.This phenomenon is getting worse as the progress of the financial reform in China.Extreme averseness to short-term risk,preference for short-term profit,and the limitation of lending interest rate easily cause bank to over-lend in low risk credit market.Soft budget and the attention to maintain good relationship with bank is the main reason of overborrowing for corporations.The same model in banks' management reinforces so-called herd behavior,so lending concentration is not avoidable.The credit crowding causes the improper of the credit distribution that jeopardizes the efficiency of credit resources.

信贷市场银行行为金融改革信贷配给