On the Director Compensation,CEO Compensation and Firm's Performance
基于管家理论和代理理论，研究中国上市公司CEO与董事薪酬的三种关系（合谋、单向激励、双向激励），发现CEO薪酬与未来绩效正相关，而董事薪酬无显著影响，表明存在单向激励。
Based on the Stewardship theory and Agency theory,the paper analyzes the complex relationships between CEO and directors of board.The authors hypothesize there exist such three kinds of relationships as collusion, one-side incentive and mutual incentive if only considering the consistent correlation of CEO's compensation and director's compensation.Then,the authors test those relationships by surveying Chinese listed companies of 2005-2007 on the association between their compensation and firm performance.By using Pooled regress, Fixed-effect regress and sensitivity analysis,the results show CEO's compensation is related positively to firm's future performance but directors' compensation doesn't take an effect on firm performance though both of them are positively correlated significantly,so there is one-side incentive situation instead of collusion or mutual incentives in Chinese listed companies,which means CEO choose the suitable role while directors play agents' roles and lead to boards' strategy role weaker than their control roles.The further test finds that CEO' incentive compensation is better than director's incentive compensation regardless of CEO's compensation and director's compensation are both related to the firm prophase performance,so boards should take an efficiency incentive mechanism on directors in China.