Participating Policy,Agency Theory and Agency Cost of Equity in Life Insurance Firms
基于代理理论，研究了分红保单如何加剧股份制保险公司股东与经理人之间的激励冲突，并利用46家寿险公司6年数据检验了分红保单使用与股权代理成本的关系。
Based on the agency theory,this paper discusses the mechanism that participating insurance policy may exacerbate the incentive conflicts of shareholder-manager in stock insurance firms.By employing 6-year unbalanced panel data of 46 life insurance companies from 2005 to 2010,this paper tests the hypotheses regarding participating policy usage and agency cost of equity.The results demonstrate that participating policy usage has significant positive relationships with agency cost of equity and is affected by the trade-off of incentive conflicts between the shareholder-policyholder and the shareholder-manager.