Tunneling and CEO Incentive Contract
通过中国上市公司数据，研究了控股股东隧道行为对CEO激励合约的影响，发现隧道行为降低了CEO薪酬与业绩的敏感性，增加了在职消费，损害了中小股东利益。
This paper establishes a principal- agent model in examining the effect of tunneling on CEO incentive contract Using data from publicly listed firms in China during 2005 and 2011,the paper finds that tunneling leads to declines in CEO pay- performance sensitivities and CEO turnover- performance sensitivities.In addition,tunneling leads to significant increases in CEO perks.The results indicate that tunneling expropriates the interests of minority shareholders,reduces the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and increases agency costs.To improve the relationship among controlling shareholders,management and minority shareholders,the government should continue to reform ownership structure,strengthen information disclosure and monitor CEO compensation.