Diversified Investment,Agency Problem and Corporate Performance
研究了2002-2004年中国上市公司多元化投资与企业价值的关系，发现多元化投资降低企业价值，且不同产权约束下表现不同，地方政府控股公司最差，私营企业次之，中央政府控股公司无显著影响。
This paper differs from the formerly method of measuring diversified investment.Based on the sample of the listed companies in 2002～2004,it examines the relationship between diversified investment of Chinese listed companies and the value of enterprises.And it proved that diversified investment puts down the value of enterprises.Moreover,listed companies with different poverty rights restrains have different diversified investment performances.In this kind of situation,listed companies controlled by local government have the worst investment performances,and privately-owned corporations take second place,yet diversification doesnt have obvious effect on the performances of the listed companies controlled by central government.Furthermore,based on the agency theory,the author finds the reason why diversified investment performances would be different under different poverty rights restrains.The conclusion is that operators'self-interest,government intervention and controlling shareholder' self-interest are the most essential elements.