Short Swing Trading by Insiders
研究中国上市公司内部人（董事、监事、高管）的短线交易能否获得异常收益，发现监事交易更多且择时能力更强，而声称误操作等解释的交易无异常收益，说明解释基本属实。
focusing on short swing trading of insiders including directors, supervisors and senior managers, this paper examines three questions; can swing trading of insiders gain abnormal return? Does the abnormal return vary with insider's position? Are the explanations of insiders for their short swing trading the truth? With the da- ta from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this empirical study finds that swing trading of insiders gain #8226; abnormal return in general; supervisors have more short swing trading and more powerful ability of timing than other insiders; and that short swing trading without claimed explanations gain more significant abnormal return and have more powerful ability of timing while other trading with claimed explanations ( such as incorrect manip- ulation or unfamiliar with regulations) have no abnormal return, which indicates that the explanations of insiders for their short swing trading are generally the truth.