Is There Moral Hazard in Chinese Automobile Insurance Market?—Evidence from Dynamic Renewal Policies
利用动态续保数据，通过参数和非参数方法分析中国汽车第三者责任险市场中的道德风险，发现降低保额后索赔概率显著下降，且存在有利选择效应。
According to the coverage selection style of policyholders between two consequent years,controlling the effects of heterogeneous risk on moral hazard incentive effect,we divide dynamic renewal data into groups, and analyze if there exists moral hazard or other incentive effects in Chinese automobile third-party liability insurance market by using Logistic regression model(parametric method) and conditional correlation approach (non-parametric method).The results show,moral hazard is not significant for the increasing coverage group but significant for the decreasing coverage group,which indicates significant lower claim probability after decreasing coverage.Moreover,when considering the effect of buying no deductible attachment policy,there also exists significant evidence of advantageous selection in the decreasing coverage group.