Board Network,Governance Role of Independent Directors and Executive Incentives
基于连锁董事构建的董事会网络，研究发现独立董事的网络中心性能够增强高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性，且该效应在非国有企业中更强，网络解释的薪酬部分能提升公司未来业绩。
We explore the governance role of independent directors based on the social network.Specifically, we choose the board network defined by relations constructed by interlocked directors,and use social network analysis method to explore the effects of the board network on the governance role of independent directors in executive incentives.We document that,independent directors' board network centrality can enhance the executives' pay - performance sensitivity.Compared with non - SOEs,this effect is weaker in SOEs,which implies the direct or indirect regulation of the SOEs' executive incentives can reduce board network's influence. Additional analysis shows that the compensation components explained by board network can indeed improve companies' future performance.Our results have benefits to the evidence of social network and corporate governance.