On the Choice Preference of Controlling Shareholders for Corporate Governance Mechanism
基于2003年中国公司治理指数数据，发现控股股东对不同治理机制有不同偏好，倾向于选择能获取私人利益和声誉的机制，而回避重要但琐碎的机制。
In this paper,on a basis of the Chinese Corporate Governance Index(CCGI~(NK))in 2003,the authors find that blockholders of listed companies have different impacts on and different choice preference to different corporate governance mechanisms.Concretely,the controlling shareholders enhance corporate governance mechanisms to some extent based on different governance strategies in order to enlist private benefits and getclear market reputation,but avoid the important and dwell on the trivial so that they prefer CCGI_(IDI)~(NK),and CCGI_-~(NK) _(STH)to CCGI_(SH)~(NK),CCGI_(BOD)~(NK),CCGI~(MI)~(NK)and CCGI_(SC)~(NK)in order to control corporate governance and management.On the contrary,shareholding percents of other blockholders and counterbalance degrees(or combined counterbalance degrees)of blockholders are negatively associated with CCGI~(NK)and especially with CCGI_(IDI)~(NK)and CCGI_(STH)~(NK)more significantly than with CCGI_(SH)~(NK),CCGI_(BOD)~(NK),CCGI_(MI)~(NK)and CCGI_~(SC)~(NK).