Information Hiding, Information Screening and Bidding ROSCAs Defaults Evidence from Chunfeng Town, Zhejiang Province
研究了竞价型互助会中成员通过信息隐藏（如激进竞标并组织新会）推迟但扩大违约规模的行为，并发现地方政府通过提供选择菜单成功筛选成员、降低退出成本。
The paper analyzes the participation, bidding and origination behaviors of ROSCAs, and then empiri- cally tests the existence of information hiding by using systemic bidding ROSCAs defaults data in Chunfeng town, Wenzhou, Zhejiang province. The authors find that the number of ROSCAs originated by its member is positively correlated with their aggressive bidding behaviors. It implies that while some ROSCAs members are bidding aggressively to exit existing ROSCAs, on the other hand, they organize new ones to fund at zero cost Such information hiding behaviors postpone the outbreak of systemic bidding ROSCAs defaults, but increase its scale. The paper also studies local government's resolution from an information screening perspective.! It is find that local government sorts ROSCAs members successfully by offering them a menu of alternative choices, thus lowering their exit cost This is the key point of local government's successful resolutions. ■