State - owned Enterprises Restructuring,Board Independence,and Investment Efficiency
研究了国有企业重组类型、董事会独立性及其交互作用对投资效率的影响，发现不完全重组企业因代理问题更严重而投资效率更低，独立董事能通过减少控股股东掏空问题来降低投资不足。
The paper investigates the effects of state-owned enterprises restructuring type,board independence, and their interaction on the investment efficiency.It is found that incompletely restructured companies' investment efficiency is lower than that of completely restructured companies due to the incompletely restructured companies' agency problems of managers,and controlling shareholder are more serious than the completely restructured companies.Independent directors can reduce underinvestment by reduce controlling shareholders' tunneling problems,but have no significant effects on overinvestment Since investment is an important resource allocation behavior,and board structure is an important corporate governance mechanism.The above findings show how state-owned enterprise restructuring type affect resource allocation efficiency and board independence affect the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise restructuring,and enriched our understanding about SOE reform and corporate governance role of board independence.