Administrative Experienced Executives,Corporate Performance and Nonproductive Expenditures:an Empirical Evidence from Listed State-owned Enterprises
研究发现国有企业中具有行政经验的董事长和CEO会损害企业绩效，并将更多资源投入非生产性活动，导致政治成本和代理成本增加。
This paper explored that the chairman of director board and the CEO in the SOEs can affect the enterprise significantly,whether their former administrative experience will affect the performance of the company. We find firsdy the administrative experienced executives do harm the corporate performance;secondly the administrative experienced executives put more resources into nonproductive activities,which bring more nonproductive expenditures,results in more political costs and agency costs.The empirical evidences in the paper shows that the personnel control intervened by the government twists the regular top executives motivation mechanism, and it do harms the allocation efficiency of resources.