Rent Seeking in Elite Networks
利用德国精英服务俱乐部的独特数据，研究精英网络中的社会关系如何影响银行信贷分配，发现激励弱对齐的银行家最积极参与裙带贷款，导致资源错配并抑制经济繁荣。
We employ a unique data set on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending. Our findings, thus, resonate with existing theories of elite networks as rent extractive coalitions that stifle economic prosperity.