Social Goals,Labor Change and Privatization Pricing
研究中国上市公司私有化中，控制权转让价格与私有化后劳动力变化的关系，发现价格越低劳动力增加越多，尤其低质量劳动力，这违背市场定价原则，原国有股东为达成社会目标而降低价格。
Using a sample of listed firm's privatizations in China,this paper investigates the relation between privatization pricing and the labor change after privatization.We find that the transfer price of control right is negatively related with the labor change after privatization.Further evidence shows that this relation is much stronger for low quality labor than for high quality labor.This relation contradicts the pricing principle in market economy.Our explanation for this is that,to achieve its social goals,the former state controlling shareholder reduces the transfer price as an exchange for a bigger increase or a smaller decrease in labor after privatization. Our study offers new evidence for us to understand the pricing process of privatization in China