GAME ON LAND-USE MONITORING PRACTICE IN CHINA AND DECISION-MAKING
研究了因信息不对称，土地督察员、地方政府和土地监管部门之间的博弈，构建了博弈模型，并提出了减少违法用地的对策。
Illegal land-use practice has been a hot and difficult problem in land-use management in China. According to the current situation of illegal land-use condition,this paper puts forward the opinion that there exist game practices among land supervisor,local government and land supervision department because of information asymmetry,and conceives a game model among them based on the assumption that they are rational and strive to maximize their interests. In this model,land supervisor's wage(W),striving and struggling costs(HS),revenue and future possible loss caused by personal corruption(FL),local government's revenue and loss by illegal land-use(PU)are considered as the main factors. By analyzing these factors,this paper brings forward some methods to solve the problem of information asymmetry in the supervision of illegal land-use,and some countermeasures to reduce the phenomena of illegal land-use are suggested.