Is CEO Compensation Incentive Relative to Performance Valid in Chinese Listed Companies
从外生视角分析中国上市公司CEO薪酬与绩效的关系，发现董事会控制下薪酬正向促进绩效，但绩效提升主要源于外部环境而非董事会特征，支持代理理论和制度理论。
Most papers studied the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance on endogenous perspective only basing on the Principle-Agent Theory,while this paper analyzes CEO compensation incentives related to firm performance concerning on Stewardship Theory and Institute Theory from exogenous perspectives as well.The findings are(1)CEO compensation is positive related to firm performance significantly under the control of board of directors,and the rewarded CEO will work hard to enhance firm performance significantly, which causes Post-Incentive Effects(PIE),but(2)firm performance is not significant related to the characteristics of Board of directors,namely,the improvement of firm performance is caused by outside environment instead of the control of Boards,which support Agency Theory and Institute Theory,(3)Only the convergence of ownership positively supports Post-Incentive Effects and negatively related to CEO compensation,so it encourages Stewardship Theory.The analysis is based on the panel data of Chinese listed companies over four-year period from 2005 to 2008,and the result is still robust when comparing Pooled-regress to Fixed-effect regress for three groups of different State-owned companies comparing with Private-owned companies,Collective-owned companies and all samples.Finally,the 2SLS regress and the sensitive analysis of CEO compensation show that CEO compensation related to performance is reaching availability.