Investor Protection,Political Connection and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation
基于2004-2009年中国民营上市公司数据，检验了地区投资者保护和政治关联对企业资本配置效率的影响，发现投资者保护能提升投资效率并缓解融资约束，且对无政治关联企业影响更显著。
Using the sample of the Chinese private listed firms from 2004 to 2009,this paper tests the impact of local investor protection and political connections on the firm's capital allocation efficiency.The results suggest that firstly,better investor protection can improve investment efficiency and reduce financing constrain,while political connections have no effect on investment efficiency.Secondly,comparing with the firms with no political connections,investor protection has more significant effect on the capital allocation of the firms with political connections.Thirdly,firm - level investment predicts growth more strongly in the regions with better investor protection,while political connections have no significant effect on the firm's growth sensitivity to investment. This paper combines investor protection system and political connections into the research framework,and provides us with a meaningful perspective to compare formal institutional environment with informal substitute institution in the transitional economy.