Related Loans and Compensation Contracts of Commercial Banks;Evidence from Commercial Banks of China
基于2005-2009年中国商业银行数据，研究发现高管薪酬与银行贷款正相关，但关联贷款规模会削弱这一关系，同时增加高管在职消费，且该现象仅存在于内资控股银行，为大股东掏空动机影响薪酬合约提供了直接证据。
Using the data of Chinese commercial banks from 2005 to 2009,this paper studies the influence of tunneling motivation of big shareholders on the compensation contracts of commercial banks from the view of related loans.The results show that there is a significantly positive relationship between managerial compensations and banks' loans.This relationship,however,is weakened by the size of related loans.At the same time,the more the size of related loans,the more the perquisites of managements.The results exist in banks controlled by Chinese shareholders,but not in those controlled by foreign shareholders.The results also show that big shareholders will weaken the correlation of managerial compensations and related loans and provide managements with more perquisites for the aim to obtain more related loans more easily.This paper provides a direct evidence for the influence of big shareholders' tunneling motivation on banks compensation contracts.This paper contributes to extant literature about related loans and corporate governance of banks and has practical effects to banks and regulators.