On the Window of Opportunity,Adverse Selection Cost and Equity Financing Preference
研究发现股票市场高估时期上市公司更偏好股权融资，高估股价是主因，逆向选择成本无法阻止这一偏好，且时机窗口发行会损害流通股东利益，建议监管限制时机选择并增加股票供给。
There is a stronger equity financing preference in listed companies during the period of stock market overvalued.The paper,based on thewindow of opportunity,builds up an equity financing preference model from a view of non-rational market The results show that that overvalued stock prices is the basic reason of equity financing preference,and the cost of adverse selection can not stop the financing preference shares of listed companies.Meanwhile,the firms that issue seasoned equity under thewindow of opportunity,no matter their quality and post-issue performance,are significandy lower than other refinancing firms in different periods, which damage the interests of circulating shareholders.Therefore,the author suggests that SEC should restrict firms from taking window opportunity and in the long run,a more competitive primary market and adequate stock supply would help eliminate equity financing preference.