On the Governing Structure and Managerial Incentives of Commercial Banks
运用多任务代理、内部人控制和经理人市场理论，分析中国国有控股商业银行的治理结构与经理激励，指出应剥离政策性职能、完善公司治理、发展经理人市场并探索优先股制度。
Utilizing the modern theories of multitask agency, insider control and managerial labor market, this paper analyzes the governance structure and managerial incentives of state-controlled commercial banks (SC- CBs) in China. The main conclusions are as follows. First, it is not economically efficient to continue to re- quire SCCBs carry out policy functions and projects. Second, the market - oriented reforms of SCCBs result in managers having more decision - making power, which makes it necessary to establish proper corporate govern- ance and provide positive incentives to managers, otherwise insider control could become a problem. Third, the operating environment of SCCBs should be improved, and an efficient market for bank managers should be de- veloped. Fourth, the use of preferred stock should be explored as a potentially effective way to structure state ownership; preferred stock ranks senior to common stock, thus better protects state interest; preferred stock could also reduce unwanted government interference with SCCBs' daily operation, thus helping prevent SCCBs' multitasking; by incorporating preferred shareholders' interest into managers' incentive contracts, preferred shareholders could help reduce excessive risk taking by bank managers.