Sooner or Later: Timing of Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Risk-Taking
研究了不同时机和目标的货币政策工具的效果与相互作用，发现事前常规政策与事后非常规政策因囤积行为的内生性而等价，而定向干预如贴现窗口贷款可同时缓解投资和囤积两种低效问题。
We analyze the effects and interactions of monetary policy tools that differ in terms of their timing and their targeting. In a model with heterogeneous agents, more productive agents endogenously expose themselves to higher interim liquidity risk by borrowing and investing more. Two inefficiencies impair the transmission of monetary policy: an investment- and a hoarding inefficiency. Heterogeneous agents respond disparately to ex-ante, conventional and ex-post, unconventional monetary policy. However, we show that the two policies are equivalent due to the endogeneity of hoarding. In contrast, targeted interventions such as discount-window lending can alleviate both inefficiencies at the same time.