The Governance Role of Media Coverage:Multiple Agency Cost Perspectives
基于2006-2009年中国A股上市公司数据，用联立方程模型发现媒体关注能缓解股东与经理人、大股东与中小股东之间的双重代理问题，且对第一类代理问题效果更强，并与市场化环境存在替代效应。
From multiple agency cost perspectives,this paper empirically examines whether media coverage can help alleviate agency problems.Given the existence of endogenous problem between media coverage and agency costs,this paper uses the simultaneous equations model to control the problem.Using the data of Chinese Ashare listed companies from 2006 to 2009,it is found that the more serious a company's dual agency costs between shareholders and managers(Agency CostsⅠ) and between large shareholders and minority shareholders (Agency CostsⅡ) are,the higher media coverage it gets.In turn,high levels of media coverage can effectively reduce the company's dual agency costs.These effects of media coverage are found to be stronger in Agency ProblemⅠthan in Agency ProblemⅡ.Further,this paper analyzes the interaction effect between media and marketization environment,and finds that these two external governance mechanisms have a significant substitution effect between each other.