Investor Protection and Corporate Cash Holdings
基于2001-2005年中国上市公司数据，研究发现投资者保护越好，公司现金持有水平越高，且现金价值不低，因为投资者保护抑制了终极控制股东侵占现金资产的行为。
Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2001 to 2005, this paper investigates the im- pact of investor protection on corporate cash holdings and cash value from the perspective of the ultimate control- ling shareholders. The results show that, the higher levels of corporate cash holdings are associated with better investor protection, and the value of corporate cash holdings is unlikely lower at the high levels of cash. The au- thors also find that investor protection mitigates the extent of companies' underinvestment as well overinvest- ment , suggesting higher levels of corporate cash holdings are not the result of inefficient capital expenditures. Finally, the authors conclude that better investor protection restricts the motivation of the ultimate controlling shareholders to divert or abuse the cash assets of the companies, which leads to the higher valuation of cash holdings. The results imply that there may be little agency cost to holding large cash reserves in the case of bet- ter investor protection.